Evidence: Effect of Conviction in Subsequent Civil Suit by Bramblet, Henry Howe
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 32 | Issue 1 Article 8
1943
Evidence: Effect of Conviction in Subsequent Civil
Suit
Henry Howe Bramblet
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Evidence Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by
an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bramblet, Henry Howe (1943) "Evidence: Effect of Conviction in Subsequent Civil Suit," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 32 : Iss. 1 ,
Article 8.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol32/iss1/8
KENTUCKY LAW JouRN A
issue to the courts of each jurisdiction a list of the qualified and
competent psychiatrists in that jurisdiction. Let the court choose
from that list, let us say three psychiatrists, to study the accused
and submit to the jury their findings as to just what his mental
condition was at the time of the crime, such specialists to be paid
by the county. Then have the court instruct the jury as to the
basic requirement that the accused be capable of formulating the
intent necessary to commit the crime in order to be guilty of that
crime, and at the same time instruct them that the findings of the
committee are to be taken as impartial evidence upon the question
of whether or not the accused was capable of formulating that
intent at the time of the crime, to be considered in arriving at their
verdict. This solution preserves the jury system with its advantages
(and disadvantages), but gives this body the benefit of unbiased
expert opinion on what may be a highly difficult question-was
this defendant insane?
Although the above suggestion may not be the best solution
to the problem, it is the author's contention that in view of the
present circumstances, if adopted they would accomplish a great
deal toward improving a bad situation.
CARLETON M. DAVIS
EVIDENCE: EFFECT OF CONVICTION IN SUBSEQUENT
CIVIL SUIT
The great weight of authority, both ancient1 and modern,2 sup-
ports the rule that a judgment of conviction or acquittal is mad-
missible in a civil suit to establish the truth of the facts on which
it was rendered. As an exception to this rule it is well settled
that a prior conviction rendered upon a plea of guilty is admissible.'
Where the judgment in the crnimal court is the foundation of the
civil suit or where the subsequent action, although civil in form,
is quasi-crimnmal, as in actions for penalties, the courts have
readily admitted the judgment.
I The source of the rule dates back to The King v The War-
den of the Fleet, 12 Mod. 337, 88 Eng. Rep. 1363 (1721).
'See note 3 snfra.
'Notes (1924) 31 A.L.R. 261; (1928) 57 A.L.R. 504; (1932)
80 A.L.R. 1145; (1941) 130 A.L.R. 690.
'Duerr v. Ky. & Ind. Bridge & R. R. Co., 132 Ky. 228, 116
S.W 325 (1909) Stewart v. Stewart, 93 N.J. Eq. 1, 114 At. 851
(1921), Russ v. Good, 92 Vt. 202, 102 Atl. 481 (1917). In this class of
cases, however, the judgment is not considered as conclusive evi-
dence of the truth of the facts on which it is rendered. Anders
v. Clover, 198 Mich. 763, 165 N.M 640 (1917), Burgess v. Burgess, 47
N.H. 395 (1867), Spain v. Oregon Was. R. and Nay. Co., 78 Ore. 355,
153 Pac. 470 (1917).
'United States v. One Ford, 21 F (2d) 628 (1927), United
States v. Rosenthal, 174 Fed. 652 (1909), Coffey v. United States,
116 U.S. 436, 6 Sup. Ct. 436 (1886).
SUDENT Nons
However, the modern tendency, both in England' and America, 
7
is to favor the admissibility of a conviction as evidence of the
facts on which it is based. Those jurisdictions admitting such
convictions are in conflict, however, as to the evidential weight
such judgments should carry. The conflict concerns the question
whether one conviction shall be deemed a conclusive bar to the
civil suit or merely as prima facie evidence which may be rebutted.
In Matter of Crppen's Estate,' the leading English authority,
the executrix and legatee of a man convicted and executed for
wife murder unsuccessfully sought administration of the wife's
estate. It was held that judgment of conviction of the criminal
offense was admissible against the convict and those claiming
under him as presumptive proof of hIs actual guilt.
The rule in New York has from an early day relaxed the strict
rule of complete exclusion. In the early case of Maybee v. Avery,9
the plaintiff instituted an action of slander, alleging that defendant
had called him a thief and charged him with stealing chickens.
Defendant offered in evidence the record of conviction of plaintiff
for the offense charged. The judgment of conviction was ad-
mitted but held to be merely prima facie evidence which the plaintiff
was allowed to controvert. Ths view was sustained in the recent
New York case of Schindler v. Royal Insurance Co." Here the
answer set out a provision of the policy avoiding liability in case
of fraud by the insured, and as a bar to the action, the conviction
of the insured of the statutory offense of making fraudulent proof
under such policy The court refused to accept the former con-
viction as a plea in bar but admitted it as prima facie evidence of
the facts involved. The majority of the jurisdictions which admit
in evidence a former conviction have seen fit to follow the New
York rule in determining the weight to be given such judgment."
The minority view adopts the rule of conclusiveness in its
entirety and holds the former conviction a complete bar to the civil
suit." This is best exemplified by Eagle, Starr and Dominion Insur-
ance Co. v. Heller"3 Here the claimant was tried and convicted of
the crime of burning his house. In an action brought by him to
recover on an insurance policy it was held that the record of con-
'Matter of Crippen's Estate, L.R.P.D. 108 (1911).
'Note (1941) 130 A.L.R. 690, cited supra note 3; 4 WGMOm,
EVmENc E (3d ed. 1940) Sec. 1346a (collection of cases), 5 WIGmORE,
EVIENCE (3rd ed. 1940) Sec. 1671a.
8L.R.P.D. 108 (1911) cited supra note 6.
'18 Johns (N.Y.) 352 (1820).
258 N.Y. 310, 179 N.E. 711, 80 AL.R. 1142 (1932).
See supra note 3 and 'nfra note 12.
"Apparently only two states, Virginia and New Mexico, have
adopted the rule of conclusiveness; Supuluer v. Gilchrist & Dawson,
28 N.M. 329, 211 Pac. 595 (1922); Eagle, Starr and British Dominion
Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82, 140 S.E. 314 (1927).
149 Va. 82, 140 S.E. 314 (1927) cited supra note 12.
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viction in the crimnal action was admissible as concluszve proof of
the fact that the plaintiff had burned his house and hence was a bar
to the recovery on the policy. In its opinion the court stated:"
"To permit a recovery under a policy of fire insurance by
one who has been convicted of burning the property insured,
would be to disregard the contract, be illogical, would dis-
credit the administration of justice, defy public policy and
shock the most unenlightened conscience."
Kentucky has seen fit to adopt the rule laid down by New
York. This view was taken by the court in Wolff et al. v. Employers
Fire Insurance Company,' the most recent Kentucky decision on
the point. In this case a final judgment, convicting insured of
willfully and feloniously burning insured property was not res
3udicata of the right of the insured to maintain a civil action
against the insurer on the policies but was adnussible as a
relevant circumstance to be considered by the jury in determm-
ing whether or not the insured willfully destroyed such prop-
erty. 6
An inquiry into the reasons usually assigned for the rule
of complete exclusion causes them to appear inadequate. It is
often said that the prior judgment of conviction or acquittal is
inadmissible because of the difference in parties, ' the possible
variations in the rules of evidence,' the degrees of proof," and the
competency of the witnesses." Since it is not argued that the
1 Ibid., at 323.
"282 Ky 824, 140 S.W (2d) 640 (1940).
'Other Kentucky cases are Occidental Ins. Co. v Chasteen et
al., 255 Ky. 710, 75 S.W (2d) 363 (1934) (prior acquittal of arson
excluded, prejudicial error by the court), Westchester Fire In-
surance Company of New York v. Brown, 219 Ky 41, 292 S.W 504
(1927) (acquittal for barn burning held not conclusive in suit on
policy), Liverpool & London & Globe Insurance Company v. Wright
et al., 166 Ky. 159, 179 S.W 49 (1915) (conviction of arson not
a bar to subsequent suit on policy).
It is interesting to note that in Kentucky " in an action for
false imprisonment or malicious prosecution a rule peculiar
to such actions applies to the efficacy of the judgment which termi-
nates the proceedings If the prosecution or arrest complained
of terminated in the acquittal of the party of the crime or offense
for which he was prosecuted or arrested, he can use the judgment
in his favor as evidence that there was no probable cause for
his prosecution or arrest, and if convicted the judgment is
conclusive (italics added) evidence of the existence of probable
cause " Liverpool & Globe Insurance Co. v. Wright, et al., 166
Ky. 159, 166, 179 S.W 49, 52 (1915).
"'Fowle v. Child, 164 Mass. 210, 41 N.E. 291 (1895), 2 FREEMAN,
LAW OF JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) Sec. 654.
"See Seaboard Air Line Ry v O'Qum, 124 Ga. 357, 52 SE. 427,
429 (1905); 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 472, 474.
"Westchester Fire Insurance Company of New York v. Bowen,
219 Ky. 41, 42, 292 S.W 504, 505 (1927), cited supra note 16.
2Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. O'Qum, 124 Ga. 357, 52 S.E. 427, 429
(1905), 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 472, 474, cited supra note 18.
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conviction be used in any way except against the original de-
fendant, the difference in parties seems to be of no material sig-
nificance. While the objection based upon the degrees of proof
mght be warranted if an acquittal were introduced as evidence
of the fact upon which it is based, it is clearly unsound when
applied to convictions where the state has the burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. If there are any differences in the
rules of admissibility of evidence and competency of witnesses,
they are usually in favor of the accused." The want of mutuality
has also been advanced to support the rule of exclusion. Here
the judicial thought seems to be that a party should not intro-
duce evidence of a conviction since his adversary could not have
introduced a verdict of acquittal if such had been rendered.
'
It has been argued that the opinion rule and the hearsay
rule present obstacles to the admission of the prior convictions.,,
But the objections based upon the hearsay rule are easily sur-
mounted when it is remembered that the party against whom the
conviction is offered was present at the crmnnal trial and was
confronted by the witnesses against him with the right to cross
examine them; Although the judgment of conviction represents
the opinion of the jury or judge, it is usually a reliable and trust-
worthy opinion formed by those acting under a duty inposed by
law. It is not unusual in our law to allow as evidence the find-
ings of those required by law to make official investigations.
In conclusion, it would appear that the modern tendency,
followed by Kentucky, which allows a prior conviction to be
admitted in a subsequent civil suit as merely prima facze evidence
of the facts upon which it was based, is most logical and will
insure justice in the greater number of cases.
HENRY HowE BRAMBLET
= In Georgia the defendant in a criminal case is not allowed to
testify under oath, Ga. Code (Michie, 1926), Penal Code Sec.
1037 (2). It has been suggested that a finding influenced by this
rule should not be used against the criminal defendant in a subse-
quent civil action, where he may be a witness. Seaboard Air Line
Ry. v. O'Qum, 124 Ga. 357, 52 SE. .427 (1905) cited supra note 18.
2Liverpool & London & Globe Insurance Company v. Wright
et al., 166 Ky. 159, 179 S.W 49 (1915), cited supra note 16; 2 FREE-
MAN, LAW OF JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) Sec. 654.
212 FREEMAN, LAW OF JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) Sec. 654, cited
supra note 22.
2 'Chafee, Progress of the Law (1928) 35 Harv. L. R. 302, 440;
Note (1926) 40 Harv. L. R. 909; and cf. Howe v. Howard, 158 Mass.
278, 33 N.E. 528 (1893) (Previous assessment by a jury not evidence
of value in condemnation proceedings).
0 Holliday v. Shepherd, 269 Ill. 429, 109 N. 976 (1915) (lunacy
inquisition), 4 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) Secs. 1664-1676 for
general discussion.
